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IN THE SUPREME CO·URT
O·F THE STATE OF UTAH
In re:
Case No.

GEORGE H. BADGER

12052

Disciplinary Proceeding

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
NATURE OF CASE
Disciplinary proceeding before the Board of Commissioners of the Utah State Bar.
DISPOSITION BY BAR COMMISSIONERS
The Board of Commissioners of the Utah State Bar
has recommended to the Utah Supreme Court that an
order of disbarment be entered against George H.
Badger, disbaring him from the practice of law in the
State of Utah.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Disciplinary Committee of the Utah State Bar
prays that the recommendation of the Board of Commissioners of disbarment be adopted.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
On February 24, 1964, the Third Judicial District
Court for Salt Lake County, Judge Stewart M. Hanson
presiding, in the case of Bigler vs. Badger an.d Howell,
Civil No. 134741, after a full trial on the merits, made
and entered Finding of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Judgment finding that Mr. Badger had committed common law fraud against the defendant-intervenor Howell
and awarded Howell judgment against Badger in the
principal sum of $20,000.00 ( Exh. 25). Following entry
of judgment, counsel for Mr. Badger made a timely motion to amend the findings to omit the finding of fraud,
but the motion was denied (Exh. 25, p. 58). However,
during the course of the disciplinary hearing, some five
and one-half years after the findings were originally
made and entered, Mr. Badger and his counsel obtained,
ex parte, an irregular order purportedly modifying the
findings so as- to remove the finding that Mr. Badger
had committed common law fraud against Howell (Exh.
48). The Disciplinary Committee found that such order
was inPffectual and did not legally change the original
findings (R. 50).
Mr. Badger was present and testified in the fraud
action and was represented by attorney Arthur H. Neilsen. There is no indication that his position and interests
were not fully represented on the merits. Mr. Howell
was present and testified at the disciplinary hearing (R.
555-583) and there is no showing in the record that any
other witnesses desired by Mr. Badger to testify in his
defense at the disciplinary hearing were not available
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because of any delay in the bringing of the disciplinary
proceeding.
Mr. and Mrs. Howell contacted Mr. Dean Sheffield,
Executive Secretar>' of the Utah State Bar, sometime in
1961 or 1962 regarding their complaint against Mr.
Badger, but when advised they would have to make a
formal complaint, failed to do so (R. 727). However,
Mr. HowPll did write a letter to the Bar on July 22,
19G5 (Exh. 1) after the fraud lawsuit had been concluded
which stated only:
"I \vould like very much to make a complaint
against a lawyer known as George Badger, and
\rnuld like to have >'OU investigate him.
The facts are set forth in the Civil File No. 134741
of the District Court of Salt Lake County in the
case of Richard Bigler vs. Dale Howell and Nora
Cox Howell vs. George Badger and LaJuana I.
Badger.
I should be happ:--' to be at your disposal should
you wish to contact me."
Disciplinary proceedings were commenced against
Mr. Badger on September 17, 1968, approximately three
years after Mr. Howell's letter to the Bar.
Several other complaints regarding Mr. Badger
were also under investigation during this period of time,
some of which were incorporated into the complaint, and
some of which, for various reasons, were not.
The activities of Mr. Badger with respect to the
Federal Check Clearing House collection agency came

to the attention of the Bar in December 1967 when Mr.
Sheffield was contacted by several attorneys whose
clients had received the demand cards and letters similar
to Exhibits 13 and 14 and by Mr. Jacobs who worked on
check collection matters for Albertson's Food Stores (R.
202 & 206). The evidence in this matter indicates that in
the early part of September 1967 (R. 596), Mr. Badger,
in conjunction with a Mr. Jack Harrison, organized a
collection agency known as the Federal Check Clearing
House, Salt Lake City Branch. This company was organized as the result of an idea conceived by Mr. Badger
(R. 604). He was the only attorney associated with the
company when it was organized (R. 603-604). The language on the "computer" card (Exh. 14) stating:
"After 14 days a summons will be issued. You will
be required to pay court costs and punitive
damages.''
/was draffod or approved by him (R. 606-607) and he
authorized the use of his signature stamp (R. 606) in
i signing demand letters such as the one stamped with his
signature dated October 27, 1967, which reads:
"I represent Federal Check Clearing House, who
now holds the above check for payment.
As you probably know, the issuance of a dishonored check is a criminal offense. Utah State Penal
code, Section 76-20-11 states: . . . 'the making,
drawing, altering or delivery of such check shall
be prirna facie evidence of intent to defraud.... '
Demand is hereby made upon you for immediate
payment of $37.00, which includes $7.00 attorney's
fees and costs to date.
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Remittance must be made in either money order,
cashiers or certified check payable to Federal
Check Clearing House. Upon receipt, the dishonored check will be returned to you.
If payment in full is not received by November
3, 1967, a summons will automatically be issued
and you will be required to pay additional court
costs and punitive damages amounting to $28.00
or more." (Exh.13).

Also, Mr. Badger took an active part in soliciting
customers for Federal Check Clearing House (R. 213215 & 234). One of his selling points for the services of
Federal Check Clearing House was that if legal action
became necessary, he could handle it himself since he
·was an attorney (R. 21G & 235). As a further inducement
to prospective customers, the full amount of any check
collected by the agency was to be remitted to the customer without the usual deduction for costs of collection
or attorney fees (R. 191-193, 197 & 615-616).
POINT I
COMMISSION OF FRAUD BY AN ATTORNEY
JUSTIFIES DISBARMENT.

On or about January 24, 1962, an action was commenced in the Third J ndicial District Court in and for
Salt Lake County, Civil No. 134741, by Richard Bigler
against George Badger in which the plaintiff prayed for
temporary restraining order, restraining defendant Badger from negotiating or attempting to negotiate certain
promissory notes. The complaint alleged, among other
thing::;, that two promissory notes were given Badger
5

without consideration and that the same were to be held
by the said Badger and not negotiated to any party
(Exh. 25, pp. 1-3). During the course of that Civil action,
defendant Lajuana I. Badger was joined as a defendant
and Dale Howell and Nora Cox Howell, his wife, were
joined as intervenors. The answer, counterclaim and
crossclaim filed by the Howells alleged, among other
things, that for valuable
George H. Badger
and Lajuana I. Badger executed and delivered to the
Howells an undivided one-half interest in and to the
promissory notes which were the subjeot of ithe action
and that they had no notice of any infirmities with respect to the instruments (Exh. 25, pp. 25-28).
The trial judge made and entered Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law in said action on the 24th day
of February, 1964 (Exh. 25, pp. 46-52) which are set
forth in full in the Appendix attached hereto for the
convenience of the Court. Paragraph 2 of the Conclusions of Law concludes in effect that the delivery and
assignment of the two promissory notes totaling $55,000.00 by defendants Badger to plaintiffs Howell on or
about November 8, 1961 was a fraudulent transaction
and that the notes had been issued by Bigler to defendants Badger without consideration and for no value and
upon the express condition that they were to be disclosed
to plaintiffs Howell solely for the purpose of showing
plaintiffs Howell that defendants Badger had security
with which to pay the balance owing on their home purchase agreement in the amount of $20,000.00.
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In making its recommendation of disbarment, the
Board of Commissioners had before it the entire transcript (Exh. 30) of the proceedings in Civil No. 134741.
The transcript bears out the Findings and Conclusions adopted by the Court in the first instant, to-wit:
that the delivery and assignment of the two notes in the
amount of $55,000.00 by Badger to Howell was for valne
(possession) and was a fraudulent transaction. At page
137 of the transcript in the civil proceeding, Exhibit 30,
commencing at line 24, Mr. Howell testified as follows :

Q.

A.

''And the date of this document was the 8th
of November 1969, was actually the date you
transferred the deed to Mr. Badger, you
to your home?"
"That is right."

Q.

"And still notwithstanding the execution of
the deed and the transfer of the title, you
didn't release Mr. Badger the right to go
into the home until the 20th of November.
Is that at the time these two documents entitled 'Note and Mortgage' dated November
10 and November 20 were prepared and executed, isn't that right?"
A. "The notes, you mean, that Bigler signed?"

Q. "Yes."
A. "I didn't have only copies of those."
Q. "You knew they had been executed?"
A. "I had been told they had."
Q.

"And you didn't finally agree to have Mr.
Badger go into possession until the 20th of
November, the date that this last one of the
two documents was executed ? That is
correct?"
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A.

"This is when he took possession, but the
thing was he was always assuring me that
the $20,000 would be always guaranteed. He
would see this happen and almost immediately
we did file a lawsuit and nothing results
from it."

At the hearing before the Disciplinary CommitteP
(R. 581, line 22) Mr. Howell testified on re-cross examination consistently with the above quoted portion o.f the
transcript in the civil proceedings as follows:
"Isn't is a fact that you were told that these
notes were in existence and based upon that
representation it was then that you gaw
up possession of your house1"
A. "Yes."
Q.

Q.
A.
Q.

A.

"You actually didn't receive physical delivery
of the notes until sometime lated"
"Right."
"But it was based upon the representation
that the notes were in existence that you surrendered possession of the house and gave
title to your property?"
"Right."

It would appear that the above testimony in the
civil proceeding and before the Disciplinary Committee
supports the Findings and Conclusions adopted in thP
first instance in the Bigler case-that Howells gave up
their home in reliance upon the representations of l\fr.
Badger that he had promissory notes in the amount of
$20,000 and $35,000 resp€ctively from Richard Bigler. It
should be noted also that Mr. Badger endorsed the notes
over to Mr. Howell without recourse, which emphasizes
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.Mr. Badger's bad faith in that he knew that the notes
were valueless and were not issued for any consideration
( Exh. 34-35).
Portions of paragraph 3 of the Findings of Fact
m the civil proceeding are pertinent here and sum up
tlw statns of the matter:
" ... Said notes were obtained by the defendant
Badger from Bigler with the instruction that the
notPs were not to be delivered to the plaintiffs
or anyone else and they were executed by Bigler
solely at the request of defendant Badger to enable defendant Badger to represent to plaintiffs
that defendant Badger had security to substitufr
for the remaining lmpaid $20,000 home obligation
to plaintiffs. That all of such facts were concealed
h)' defendant Badger to the plaintiff and defendant Badger falsely represented to plaintiffs the
opposite of such facts and concealed from plaintiffs the fact that said notes were valueless and
without consideration and said representations
and omissions were made by defendant with intent to induce plaintiffs and said representations
and omissions were relied upon the plaintiffs
to their damage to the sum of $20,000."
'l'he above finding was not altered even by the effort
of .Mr. Badger to have the Court strike all reference to
fraud in the Findings, Conclusions and Judgment. The
l\Iotion to Modify was concentrated on an effort to show
that the Howells did not part with anything of value
or change their position in reliance upon or in exchange
for said notes. The recitals in the Order signed by Judge
Hanson (Exh. 48) states: "The attention of Judge Hanson was directed to portions of the transcript wherein
9

testimony concerning the times when possession of the
residence purchased by Badgers was delivered and concerning when the notes mentioned in Findings of Fact
No. 2 and 3 were delivered to Howells by Badgers". At
the hearing before the Disciplinary Committee Mr. Badger failed to point out just what testimony in the transcript was directed to Judge Hanson's attention which
altered the testimony above set forth; neither does Mr.
Badger make that effort in his brief before this court.
Mr. Badger invited the introduction into evidence
before the Disciplinary Committee the entire transcript
in the civil proceedings by his attempt to modify the
Findings, Conclusions and Judgment in the Bigler 'US.
Badger case. It is the duty of the Supreme Court to
control and set standards of conduct for attorneys who
practice before it and to investigate and inquire into their
conduct. For this purpose the transcript was competent
evidence before the Disciplinary Committee. Berke vs.
ChatG1Jiooga Bar Association, 436 S.W.2d 296 (Tenn.
1968); People vs. Howard, 364 P.2d 380 (Colo. 1961);
In re. Lacy, 112 S.W. 2d 594.
In the Lacy case, s1tpra, at page 604 the Court stated:
"The admission to the Bar and a license to practice his profession does not confer upon one any
vested right to continue in such practice. His
right to continue in the practice is dependent upon
his remaining a fit and safe person to exercise the
privilege. It is the duty of an attorney to assist
in upholding the integrity, dignity, and purity
of the courts. They are entitled to these special
privileges, under the law, for the purpose of en-
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abling them to he useful to their fellow citizens
in the ascertainment, prosecution, and defense of
legal and equitable rights, but, when the conduct
of an attornPy discloses that he is an unfit and
unsafe person to be entrusted with the responsibilities and obligations of an attorney, bis right
to continue in the enjoyment of his professional
privileges may and ought to be declared forfeited,
When such facts appear, it is the duty of the court,
by virtue of its inherent power to control the conduct of its affairs, to investigate and inquire into
such conduct. The inquiry should not be limited
or circumscribed by the strict rules of evidence."
'11 he Ftah Supreme Court has long held that when
it appcars that an attorney is lacking in honesty, integrity
and fidelity to such an extent that he can no longer receive the confidence of the court and the public, disbarment rather than suspension is the appropriate disciprocedure to protect the public interest. The
recommendation of disbannent was adopted in the case
of In re Platz, 42 Utah 439, 132 Pac. 390. In discussing
the question as to whether disbarment or suspension
should be ordered, the court stated:

"In arriYing at this conclusion we are not unmindful of respondent's argument advanced at the
hearing that merely to suspend him would be sufficient punishment. This contention entirely ignores the real purpose of disbarment proceedings.
In such proceedings, where the specifications, as
in this casP, directly charge the attorney with acts
and condnct which clearly are to the effect that
he does not possess the necessary attributes of
honesty, integrity, and fidelity to entitle him to
continue to practice his profession, the purpose
of disbarring him from following the vocation of
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an attorney at law is not to punish him, but to
protect 'the public from prejudice by removing
grossly improper persons from participation in
the administration of the law.' (Ex parte Wall, 107
U.S. 288, 2 Sup.Ct. 589, 27 L.Ed. 552.) In such
cases courts have no right, out of mere sympathy,
to shut their eyes to gross moral delinquencies
and merely suspend the offender for a short tim!.',
after which he may again practice his natural
propensities upon the innocent and confiding public. Under such circumstances, it is the duty of
the Courts to at once remove the offender from
the role of honor and to protect the public as far
as possible from being exposed to his natural
propensities. To do otherwise would be to condone
the wrong and lower the standard of professional
integrity, honesty and fidelity, which we have
neither the right nor the disposition to do."
It is immaterial whether the acts which evidence the
lack of honesty and integrity be associated with the attorney's professional practice or otherwise. The critical
question is whether or not the attorney has exhibited a
propensity to deal dishonestly with others. On this point,
the Court observed in Platz, above:

"Upon the question of whether an attorney at
law may be suspended or disbarred from practicing for acts which are outside of or are not connected with his profession the courts are somewhat at variance. The great weight of authority,
however, is to the effect that although the act
shown in evidence occurred before the accused was
permitted to practice, or are not directly connected with his practice as an attorney at law, yt>t,
if the acts and conduct in question directly show
such a lack of honesty, integrity, and fidPlity as
to clearly indicate that the accused is an unsafe,
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unfit, and improper person to be entrusted with
the powers of an attorney at law, the evidence of
such acts and conduct is material and relevant
and may, under certain circumstances, and in connection with acts shown to have been done after
admission, be sufficient to require disbarment."
In a very similar case involving misrepresentations
regarding a real property transaction, the New York
Court of Appeals, in the
of In re Issacs, 158 N.Y.S.
403, upheld thP disbarment of an attorney who knowingly had made fraudulent misrepresentations concerning
the market value of property in order to induce its sale
at a price in excess of its fair market value. In so doing,
the New York Court stated:
"An attorney engaged in the practice of law
should primarily reserve himself for his prof ession only. In this profession he is held to the
highest standard of ethical and moral uprightness
in fair dealing. There seems to be no good reason
why a lawyer should be allowed to be honest as a
lawver and dishonest as a business man. If he
desires to go into business he must take the risk,
if any is involved, and must see that his dealings
as a business man are as upright as should be
his dealings in his professional capacity."
There are literally hundreds of cases annotated at
64 ALR 2d 304, Section 2 (a), for the proposition that
"it is well established under general law, constitutional
provisions, statutes, or rules of court, etc., that good
moral character is a prerequisite for admission to the
bar."
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If lack of good moral character e,videnced in non-

professional conduct is relevant to the admission of one
to practice as an attorney at law, it should be even more
relevant after one has been admitted to the Bar, since
it then brings the legal profession into disrepute and the
potential risk of harm to the pnblic is greater, since it
shows that even the confirmation of the public trust of
being admitted as an Attorney at Law has not resulted
in a discontinuance of any unacceptable conduct that may
have been practiced prior to admission to the Bar, and
as an attorney, the person now has occasion to deal as
a fiduciary with the property of others.
respect to the case at bar, it should be noted
at no iime, either in the civil action or in the disciplinary
proceeding, did appellant deny that he owed Howell
$20,000.00 and endorsed over to Howell as security for
the $20,000.00, the two promissory notes in question
( Exhs. 34 and 35), and endorsed said notes without recourse, which can only mean that he wanted Howell
to accept the Bigler notes as valid security for his debt
when he was himself unwilling to rely upon the validity
of the notes, or at least on Bigler's willingness or ability
to pay them. Appellant must have known that they were
defective in some particular. Otherwise, he would have
been willing to stand behind them. Such a position would
seem to substantiate Mr. Bigler's contention that the
notes were given to appellant under the express instruction and understanding that they were not to be negotiated or even leave appellant's office (Exh. 30, p. 49) and
that they were valueless, having been given without
consideration (Exh. 30, p. 56).
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POINT II
SOLICITATION AND COERCION IN OPERATION OF COLLECTION AGENCY JUSTIFIES
DISBARl\IENT.

SPetion 78-51-27, U.C.A., 1953, provides as follows:
''Certain conduct forbidden - Penalty. attorney or counselor shall not: ...

fAn

(2) B>- himself, or by or in the name of another
person, eitht-r before or after action brought,
pro111isc or give, or procure to be promised or
given, a valuable consideration to any person as
an inducrment to placing, or in cosideration of
having placed, in his hands or in the hands of
another person a demand of any kind for the
purpose of bringing action thereon or of representing the claimant in the pursuit of any civil
remedy for the recovery thereof; but this subdivision does not apply to any agreement between attorneys and counselors to divide between themselves the compensation to be received.
An attorney or counselor who violates either the
foregoing subdivisions of this section is guilty of
a misdemmnor and shall be punished accordingly,
and his license to practice may be revoked or suspended." (Emphasis added).
The reeord is clear that Mr. Bigler was the motivating force bt'hind tltt' organization of Federal Check Clearing House (R. G03) and that he solicited in its behalf
(R. 213-215 & 234) as an attorney (R. 216 & 234) and
offered as an inducement that Federal Check Clearing
Honse would remit to the merchant the full amount of
any had checks collected by it (R. 191-193, 197 & 615-616).
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Section 76-19-1, U.C.A., 1953, defines extortion as
follows:
"Extortion is the obtaining of property from
another with his consent, induced by a wrongful
use of force or fear, or wnder color of official

right."

And Section 76-19-2, U.C.A., 1953, defines fear as
follows:
"Fear such as will constitute extortion may be
induced by a threat, either: ... or
(2) To acC'USe him or any relative of his or member of his family of any crime; ... " (Emphasis
added).
An examination of the "computer" cards and letters
used by Federal Check Clearing House, Salt Lake City
Branch, (Exhs. 13 & 14) indicates the following misrepresentations were made to the lay public:
(1) That Federal Check Clearing House is an agency of the Federal Government with a branch located in
Salt Lake City with the power and authority to collect
dishonored checks. It appears to be a purposeful attempt
to assume the identity of the "Federal Reserve Bank
Clearing House, Salt Lake City Branch".
(2) That dishonored checks are "automatically" rPceived by Federal Check Clearing House from the Bank
rather than from the payee, and that collection is then
handled in an impersonal manner by a computerized process with no opportunity for the debtor to explain any
extenuating circumstances or to make any arrangement
16

for partial payments, or to avoid court costs or attorney's fees.
(3) That the collection agency is entitled to collect
an attorney's fee from the check writer.
( 4) That the check writer is liable for punitive damages as a matter of course.
(5) That the check writer had committed a crime
and that the dishonored check itself is conclusive evidence
of such crime.
(6) That if the check is not paid pursuant to the
terms of Federal Check Clearing House, the check writer
will be criminally prosecuted and convicted.
Such deceit subjects an attorney to disbarment as
provided in Section 78-51-31, U.C.A., 1953,:
"Deceit and collusion. - An attorney and counselor who is guilty of deceit or collusion, or who
consrnts thereto, with intent to deceive a court or
judge or a party to an action or proceeding is
liable to be disbarred ... " (Emphasis added).
The facts proven at the disciplinary hearing would
seem to make the decision of In re Weiss, 176 Atl. 924
(Penn. 1935) applicable, wherein that court stated:

"It has been held that the fact that notices from
a collection agency are sent out under the name
of an attorney, with his knowledge, makes the attorney responsible for the methods adopted by the
association ....

17

The course of conduct pursued by the respondent
(attorney) appears to us to indicate a deliberate
and studied scheme to misuse and abuse the power
of his office....
There can be no doubt that the respondent is
guilty of improper, unethical and dishonest practice in the preparation of a fraudulent scheme.
The preparation of his plan involved care and
thought and time. Its execution was repeated over
a period of months. It appears to us that the respondent has throughout displayed such a lack
of moral perception as to demonstrate his unfitness for the practice of the law.... ''
Also in 7 Am Jr 2d, Attorneys at Law, Section 38, it is
noted:

" . . . It is held to be misconduct justifying disbarment or suspension for an attorney to employ
a collection technique that misleads or intimidates
debtors, such as using letters or demand notices
that simulate legal process, or to make improper
use of legal process, or to allow his name to be
used by others who are not directly connected
with him as partners or associates." (Authorities
cited).
Appellant seeks to excuse his conduct on the basis
that he was not practicing law at the time of the FE>deral
Check Clearing House episode and that he was not the
attorney for Federal Check Clearing House. Even if
true, such facts afford no defense to the conduct of one
who is in fact an Attorney at Law. The responsibility
of an attorney who also becomes a businessman is discussed in In re Heider, 341 P.2d 1107 (Ore. 1959) as
follows:
18

"vVe may say we are not impressed with petitioner's assertion suggestive of a dual personality;
the one a man of business and finance, the other,
and apparently a secondary concept, a lawyer.
How it may be argued that in the capacity of
business man he may indulge in practices generally condemned with reference to attorney and
client relationships, when the circumstances show
such intimate relationship as to make the two
praetically inseparable, we do not know.
When an attorney so intermingles these two aspects of his livelihood, promoting each by reliance
upon the other, he cannot escape responsibility
for conduct by averring he was acting in his business capacity and that his actions are to be evaluated and judged by the standards of the competition of the market place, rather than by those of
his profession. Law is not a business. It is a
learned profession. Under the facts of this case
there is no cleavage or separation of responsibility for petitioner's acts as a business man and as
a lawyer. He may not employ and accept the benefits of such intermingling of activity involving
both law and business without assuming responsibility for both. Further, the fact that no one was
injured by his conduct is fortuitous only and of
no significance so far as this hearing is concerned.
Embarrassment, injury and discredit were implicit therein.
On the basis of onr conclusions of guilt as above
stated and our evaluation of the entire record in
this case, we find petitioner guilty under this
count and approve the recommendation of the
Board of Bar Governors. It appears to the court
that his conduct has been such that if he were
applying for admission to the Bar his application
should be denied. It is ordered that Otto W.
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Heider be permanently disbarred from the practice of law in the State of Oregon."
The American Bar Association in its statement of
principles has held it to be improper for collection agencies to engage in the following activities:
1. To furnish legal advice, legal services, or institute judicial proceedings on behalf of other
persons.

2. To communicate with debtors in the name of
an attorney or to prepare legal documents.
3. To solicit assignment of commercial claims for
the purpose of bringing suit thereon.
4. To employ instruments simulating forms of
judicial process or to threaten the commencement of judicial proceedings.
5. To solicit claims for the purpose of having
legal action brought thereon, or to solicit
claims for any purpose at the instigation of an
attorney.
6. To assume authority of creditors to arrange
for services of an attorney.
7. To receive in any manner a share of the proper compensation for services performed by an
attorney in collection matters.
Federal Check Clearing House violated every one
of the foregoing principles and Mr. Badger, as a partner
therein, must share the responsibility for such conduct.
The ABA Committee on professional ethics and
grievances held in its Opinion No. 225 that it is:

20

1. Unethical for practicing attorneys to participate in collection activities or management of
a collection agency which solicits business.
2. Unethical for a practicing attorney who has a
financial interest in a collection agency to act
as attorney for the agency.
Mr. Badger, as an attorney, violated both of the
fore going standards.
Mr. Badger's activities in connection with the Federal Check Clearing House clearly violated the Rules of
Practice listed below which governed the conduct of an
Attorney at Law at the time of such activities, and, as
indicated by the authorities cited above, justified disbarment to protect the public interest.
Rule 9
"
It is incumbent upon the lawyer most particularly to avoid everything that may tend to mislead a party not represented by counsel, and he
should not undertake to advise him as to the law."
Rule 28
"It is unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer
advice to bring a lawsuit, except in rare cases
where ties of blood, relationship or trust make
it his duty to do so. Stirring up strife and litigation is not only unprofessional, but it is indictable at common law. It is disreputable to hunt up
defects in titles or other causes of action and inform thereof in order to be employed to bring
suit or collect judgment, or to breed litigation by
seeking out those with claims for personal injuries of those having any other grounds of action in order to secure them as clients, ... "
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Rule 29
"
. He should strive at all times to uphold the
honor and to maintain the dignity of the profession and to im}ffove not onl:· the law hut tlw administration of jnstic<•."
Rule 32
"No client, eorporate or individual, however powerful, nor any cause, civil or political, however
important, is entitled to recei\·e nor should an:·
lawyer render any service or advice involving
dislo)-alty to the law whose ministers we arP.
vVhen rendering any such improper service or
advice, the lmvyer invites and merits stern and
just condemnation .... "
POINT III
ATTORNEY WAS NOT PREJUDICED BY ANY
DELAY IN BRINGING THE DISCIPLINARY
HEARING.

Appellant contends that the disciplinar:· proceeding
with respect to the Howell matter was so stale that he
cannot properly defend the same. However, it should lw
noted that the conduct of Mr. BadgPr in quPstion in the
disciplinary proceeding was exactly the same conduct
that was in question when Civil Cas<:> No. 134741 was
tried. :Mr. Badger was competently represented in that
action and there is no indication that his position was not
fully presented The disciplinar:· }Jroceeding merely pnt
the findings of that action into evidence. No new evidence or theories ·were introducPd.
Appellant takes fop position that if the
proceeding had been commenced sooner, he could in some
22

way have suceeded in having the finding of fraud removed from the record. However, it is significant to note
that the Findings of Fact and Judgment in the Civil
action were enkred on February 24, 1964 (Exh. 25, pp.
50 & 52) and Mr. Badger's counsel, Arthur H. Nielsen,
Esq., filed a motion to alter and amend the findings, including finding No. 3 which contained the elements of
fraud ( Exh. 25, p. 54), which was heard on March 10,
1964 (eighteen days after entry) when the matter was
most fresh in the mind and memory of the trial judge and
the motion was denied (Exh. 25, p. 58). If anything, time
seems to have favored appellant's position since he, in
some manner, prevailed upon Judge Hanson to amend
the findings some five and one-half years after their
entry.
The Disciplinary Committee properly held that the
Order signed by Jndge Hanson on September 2, 1969, was
null and void as to changing the legal effect of the original findings entered in the civil action. Rulings made on
procedural motions are not generally considered to be
res judicata to the re-making of the motion at a later
date, but orders made npon motions which substantially
affect the rights of the parties involved are res judicata.
This rule is well stated in Atwood vs. Holmes, 38 N.W.
2d 62 (Minn. 1949) as follows:
"An order affecting a substantial right, and appealable, made in determining a motion after a
full hearing has been had on a controverted question of fact, and deciding a point actually litigated,
is an adjndication binding npon the parties in a
subsequent action and is conclusive upon the point
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actually litigated and determined." (Authorities
cited).
All of the foregoing elements were present in the
"motion to alter and amend the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment and in the alternative for a
new trial'' filed by appellant's counsel in the civil action
(Exh. 25, pp. 53-57) and the court's order denying the
same (Exh. 25, p. 58) was res judicata to the order obtained by appellant's present counsel during the disciplinary hearing.
Regarding the time element, it is rather interesting
to observe that appellant considers the modifying order
obtained from Judge Hanson five and one-half years
after entry of the original findings to be proper under
Rule 60(b), U.R.C.P., which provides, "The motion shall
be made within a reasonable time ... " but that the commencement of the disciplinary proceedings three years
after Mr. Howell's written notice to the Bar was unreasonable.
As mentioned under Point I, above, Mr. Howell was
called as a witness by appellant at the disciplinary hearing and there was no indication he had forgotten any
of the facts upon which the fraud finding was originally
made by the court, since he testified to the same facts
in the disciplinary hearing as he did in the civil action.
There are no returns in the file showing appellant was
unable to serve subpoenae on any other witnesses he may
have desired to produce at the disciplinary hearing; and,
in fact, the Disciplinary Committee admitted into evi24

dence the entire transcript of the civil action which, of
course, contained all of the evidence appellant wanted to
introduced on his behalf in the civil action.
Appellant points to no other evidence, available or
unavailable, which he desired to produce on this point
in the disciplinary proceeding.
Regarding the statute of limitation defense, the general rule is as stated at 45ALR1111:
''It seems, however, that, except in the few states
which have enacted specific statutes on the subject, there is no limitation on the time for instituting disbarment proceedings, except the inherent power of the court to refuse to hear an application to disbar which has been unreasonably delayed, a subject not within the scope of the present
discussion.
It has been said generally in several cases that
the ordinary statutes of limitation have no application to a disbarment proceeding." (Authorities
cited).

This court also so held in the recent case of In re
Bridwell, 474P.2d116,
" ... absent a statute or rnle on the matter, we
do not think the statute of limitations applies to
a disciplinary proceeding against a member of
the bar... "
Regarding the defense of laches, the prosecuting committee would certainly agree that if in fact laches exists,
it should apply to protect an attorney who for some reason because of a time delay in the bringing of a disciplin-
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ary proceeding is lffPjndiced in his defense to a chargP
of unethical conduct. Howenr, the passage of time alone
does not constitute laches. The party asserting the defense must show some change of condition on his part
which prejudices his defense to the claim or action m
question. At 27 Am Jur2c1, Equity, Section 169 it is
stated:
"One of the principal constituents of laches is injun·, prejudice, or disadvantage to the defendant
or an innocent third person in the event rPlic'f
is granted to the complainant. The cases proceed
upon the theor.v that laches is not, like limitation,
a mere matter of tinw, but principally a question
of the
of permitting the. claim to be enforced-an inequity founded upon some change in
the condition or relations of the property or the
parties. The doctrine of stale demand applies onl:v
where, hecausp of lapse of time, it would be inequitable to allow a party to enforce his legal
rights, or it is clearly demanded in the interests
of justice. Thus, in order that the doctrine of
laches be COI'I'Pctly applied, it should first be d<·terrnined wlwther a refusal to appl>· it ·would work
perceptible inequit>· on the one against whom the
alleged stale demand is directed. The court may
conclude that snit is not maintainable where, pending the complainant's delay in asserting his claim,
has be<:>n a change of conditions which cannot be disturbed without producing injusticP:
where rights and interests of third persons have
come into exist('nce; or where the defendant has
placed himself in a situation which will cause him
injury or prejudice if the complainant is not held
to be barred of relief.
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On the other hand, if prejudice will not be occasioned to the defendant or an innocent third
person as a result of the assertion of the complainant's right, laches is not predicable upon delay
attending the commencement of the sitit. There
is no basis for a contention that the complainant
has been gitilty of laches where the rights of third
persons are 11ot involved and the situation of the
d('fendant has not been materUilly changed by
reason of the complainant's delay in asserting his
rights.'' (Emphasis addfld).
Appellant has shown no change in his circumstances or
the circumstances of the third parties which make it unjust to proceed with the disciplinary proceeding. The
only effect the alleged delay has had upon the appellant
is that he is no longer practicing law and, therefore, the
disciplinary proceeding does not now work the hardship
upon him that it might han if it had been instituted
earlier.
CONCLUSION
The Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake
County after a fnll trial on the merits found that Mr.
Badger committed fraud against Mr. Howell and refused
to disturb that finding on a timely motion to alter and
amend said finding. Even in the motion to amend made
before Judge Hanson during the course of the disciplinary proceeding, Mr. Badger did not deny having done
the deeds complained of, but contended only that they
technically did not constitute fraud because Howell gave
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up nothing in reliance on the valueless notes since his ·
position was already that of an unsecured creditor.
It is submitted that whether or not the facts in question constituted legal fraud is immaterial. The fact that
Mr. Badger secured and attempted to negotiate worthless
promissory notes as security for a $20,000.00 debt, which
would have resu1'ted in his creditor not having the security contemplated by him, which he was enti·tled to, shows
such an utter disregard for the rights of others and demonstrates such lack of honesty and integrity in dealing
with others as to require in the public interest that his
name be removed from the roll of Attorneys at Law in
the State of Utah.
Mr. Badger's conduct in the Federal Check
House matter also shows a complete lack of legal ethics
and that he regards his license to practice as nothing
more than a business asset to be used in furthering his
commercial interests.
Mr. Badger is not and has not practiced law since
1968 and the degree of any inconvenience to him in
having his license revoked is minimal when contrasted to
the public interest to be protected in the event Mr. Badger
should in the future again attempt to intermix legal
services with his business activities.
The profession of lawyer is one which more than any
other places the practitioner in the position of being a
fiduciary with the property and rights of others and,
therefore, anyone who has exhibited a propensity to deal
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loosely, if not fraudulently, with the property rights o.f
another should not be allowed to continue in the prof ession where similar temptations will most certainly arise
in the future.
Respectfully submitted,

H. WAYNE WADS,VORTH
FRANK J. GUSTIN
Prosecuting Committee,
Utah State Bar.
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